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This paper uses dynamic panel techniques to evaluate the extent 
to which Mexico’s consumer price index will be affected by food price 
inflation in the long term. We argue that sharp increases in international 
food prices (of the type seen since 2001) are likely to persist and to 
reinforce domestic growth constraints in Mexico. Our results suggest that 
in an economy like Mexico’s that is highly dependent on imported food, 
the consumer price index will be noticeably affected by international food 
price increases. Conducting monetary policy without reference to the 
structural issue of food price inflation is therefore likely to be ineffective 
in controlling inflation and could be damaging in terms of its impact on 
demand and growth. Thus, the revitalization of the Mexican agricultural 
sector should be a centrepiece of future counter-inflationary policy.
Moritz Cruz
Researcher, National Autonomous 
University of Mexico (unam), 
Institute of Economic Research
✒ aleph3_98@yahoo.com
Armando Sánchez 
Researcher, National Autonomous 
University of Mexico (unam), 
Institute of Economic Research
✒ sva@economia.unam.mx
Edmund Amann
Senior Lecturer, University of 




MExICo: fooD PRICE InCREAsEs AnD gRoWtH ConstRAInts  •  MoRItz CRuz, ARMAnDo sánCHEz AnD EDMunD AMAnn
C E P A L  R E V I E W  1 0 5  •  D E C E M B E R  2 0 1 1
International commodity prices increased by around 195% 
in real terms during the 2001-2008 period. Food prices, 
in particular, practically doubled during the period (imf, 
2010; see also eclac, 2008), reaching unprecedented 
levels. Given the nature of the factors driving it, food price 
inflation cannot be viewed as a temporary phenomenon. 
On the demand side, pressure on food prices is stemming 
from the sustained and rapid growth of key emerging 
economies (mainly China and India) as well as from the 
generation of new sources of energy derived from basic 
food grains such as maize. On the supply side, global 
climate change and lags in technological development 
are adversely affecting efforts to increase production. 
In the near future therefore, the demand for food is 
expected to considerably outstrip supply. This, in turn, 
has led to predictions of rising international food prices 
for at least the next 10 years (oecd/fao, 2010). The era 
of cheap food, in other words, has come to an end (see 
The Economist, 2007, 2008, 2009).1
At the same time, the demand for food from net food 
importers will continue growing, according to Bruinsma 
(2003, p. 235): “The outlook to 2030 suggests that the 
agricultural trade deficit of developing countries will 
widen markedly, reaching an overall net import level 
of US$ 31 billion. Net imports of food will increase to 
about US$ 50 billion.” These two likely developments 
represent bad news for developing economies that are 
net importers of food. Food price inflation will increase 
poverty. According to the Inter-American Development 
Bank (idb, 2008), for example, in Latin America there is 
the risk that more than 26 million people will be pushed 
into extreme poverty due to food price inflation (see 
also fao, 2008, for a broader international view along 
the same lines).
Another important but rarely analysed negative effect 
of food price inflation and food dependency is their impact 
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Review and a cepal Review referee for their helpful suggestions. The 
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1 The oecd-fao Agricultural Outlook, 2010-2019 (oecd/fao, 2010, 
p. 1) points out that average maize and coarse grain prices are projected 
to be nearly 15% to 40% higher in real terms over the next 10 years 
than in 1997-2006.
on demand growth constraints. Such constraints exist 
because in developing countries, unlike rich countries, 
food weighs heavily in the consumer price index (cpi).2 
Thus, food price inflation is very likely to pass through to 
the cpi of developing economies that are net importers of 
food. Faced with rising domestic inflation, the authorities 
are likely to respond with conventional monetary and fiscal 
measures to tame inflationary pressures. If the source of 
inflationary pressure is structural, however, such efforts 
might well prove ineffective. The direct consequence 
of fighting inflation by conventional means will be to 
constrain growth by way of lower investment. In other 
words, international food price inflation might create (or 
at least reinforce) the so-called domestic demand growth 
constraint (see Kalecki, 1954; Noyola, 1956; Sunkel, 
1958) in food-dependent developing economies. 
In the same vein, food price inflation and food 
dependency might also exercise indirect upward pressure 
on inflation through the external accounts. This might 
occur in two different ways. First, when international food 
prices are soaring, more foreign exchange is needed to 
meet the demand for food imports. A shortage of foreign 
exchange coupled with an unsustainable current account 
deficit might generate expectations that the government 
will seek to devalue the currency in the near future in 
order to correct the external deficit. Expectations of a 
future devaluation will feed inflation expectations. This, 
in turn, will make the authorities tighten monetary and 
fiscal policy, restricting growth as a result. Second, if 
domestic inflation increased as a result of food price 
inflation, the real exchange rate would appreciate, causing 
the economy to lose international competitiveness. 
Exports would fall and imports, in all likelihood, would 
increase. This would lead to a deterioration of the external 
accounts. To rectify this disequilibrium, the authorities 
might decide to reduce aggregate demand, a decision 
that would inevitably have the effect of constraining 
growth further. 
Against this background, the objective of this paper 
is to explore the growth-constraining effects of food price 
inflation. In particular, it seeks to illustrate the extent 
2  Food generally accounts for about 10% of the cpi in developed 
countries. In developing economies, food can account for 50% to 
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to which food price inflation might affect domestic 
inflation and thus result in – or reinforce – the domestic 
growth constraint. The Mexican economy is used as a 
case study in this paper because its food dependency 
(particularly for imports of basic food grains) has been 
steadily growing since the mid-1980s, following trade 
liberalization policies sealed by the launch of the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (nafta). At the same 
time, the foodstuffs component still has a large weight 
in Mexico’s cpi. As a result, Mexico risks being caught 
in a dilemma, with international food price inflation 
causing domestic inflation to rise and the authorities 
finding it ever harder to keep inflation within its target 
range, so that they respond with growth-constraining 
macroeconomic policies. To measure the extent to which 
food price inflation will affect Mexico’s cpi in the long 
term, we apply dynamic panel techniques.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II describes 
how food price inflation and food dependency can both 
give rise to and reinforce demand growth constraints. 
Our analysis employs structural inflation theory, but 
focuses on the case of an open developing economy 
with food dependency in a scenario where international 
food prices are rising. Section III presents evidence for 
Mexico’s high dependence on imported food and its 
influence on the country’s cpi. Section IV then presents 
the dynamic panel estimates. The final section sets out 
our concluding remarks.
II
The macro effects of food price inflation  
and food dependency: the materialization  
of demand growth constraints 
A primary objective in developing economies is to expand 
output (and employment) rapidly and sustainably.3 A 
sine qua non for achieving this goal, generally ignored 
by the literature, is the reduction (or if possible the 
elimination) of so-called growth constraints (see Sakar, 
1988; Storm, 1997). 
These constraints are associated with excessive 
inflation and balance-of-payments disequilibria, both the 
consequence of policies to expand aggregate demand. 
The former is generally identified, for obvious reasons, 
as the domestic demand growth constraint, whereas the 
latter is recognized as the external constraint. Much of 
the seminal theoretical literature on both these growth 
constraints ignores international food price inflation or 
food dependency, or both. However, the growing influence 
and importance of these phenomena in developing 
economies’ growth processes makes it clear that 
3 As Wolf (2008) clearly puts it: “Growth is not everything. But it 
is the foundation for everything. The poorer the country the more 
important growth becomes, partly because it is impossible to redistribute 
nothing and partly because higher incomes make a huge difference 
to the welfare of the poorest.” Moreover, rapid and sustained growth 
implies increasing aggregate demand, which is the primary source 
of firms’ sales and profits.
they should be considered key sources of potential 
growth constraints.
One of the pioneers in drawing attention to 
how inflation could constrain growth was the Polish 
economist Michał Kalecki. The Kaleckian argument, 
developed in the early 1950s, was configured for a 
closed economy (perhaps because of the existence of 
domestic or international trade barriers, or both, at that 
time). Moreover, this closed economy is a developing 
one where food prices have a large weight in the cpi. In 
today’s context, only the large weighting of food in the 
cpi still holds, as most developing economies are engaged 
in the globalization process; thus, it is unrealistic to think 
in terms of a closed economy. As is pointed out below, 
however, the main result of Kalecki’s argument holds 
for an open developing economy (which we assume 
has a rigid domestic supply of food and is, therefore, 
food-dependent). By considering an open economy, 
furthermore, we are able to illustrate how the domestic 
growth constraint might be indirectly reinforced. 
Kalecki put forward the idea that an economy that 
was expanding might face excessive inflationary pressures 
if supply in the primary sector, and that of foodstuffs in 
particular, was limited. More specifically, he argued that 
one important obstacle a developing economy might face 
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when investment was increasing strongly was the difficulty 
of procuring an “adequate supply of necessities to cover 
the demand resulting from the increase in employment” 
(Kalecki, 1966, p. 16). If this supply is not adequate, 
inflationary pressures might be generated. In this sense, 
inflation, as Noyola (1956, p. 604) remarked, is chiefly 
“the result of real imbalances”.4 In other words, “the 
crucial point of whether a certain level of investment 
creates or does not create inflationary pressures is the 
possibility of expansion of supply of consumer goods 
in response to demand” (Kalecki, 1993b, pp. 25-26). If 
supply in the primary sector is indeed rigid, prices will 
increase, causing real wages to fall. Thereafter, “the 
reaction of workers to the reduction of real wages will 
be a demand for higher money wages, and thus a price-
wage spiral will be initiated” (Kalecki, 1993b, p. 26). 
As can be seen, inflation for Kalecki is the result of a 
structural problem (a real imbalance), stemming from 
the limited productive capacity of the primary sector 
to satisfy a growing demand for food. An important 
point is that institutional and structural rigidities in 
the agricultural sector mean that relative and absolute 
rises in agricultural prices do not stimulate an adequate 
supply response.
The inflationary pressure resulting from a rigid food 
supply leads to constraints on growth via investment. 
Investment can be negatively affected through two 
different mechanisms. First, policymakers might decide 
to reduce aggregate demand in order to reduce the 
demand for food, with investment shrinking as a result 
(i.e., as a result of falling public investment, but also 
of shrinking public expenditure, which in turn reduces 
firms’ sales). Second, monetary authorities in developed 
and developing economies alike generally have a strong 
belief that inflation is exclusively a monetary problem. 
To fight inflationary pressures, therefore, they apply 
conventional policies in the form of fiscal and monetary 
tightening. Both types of policies act by reining in private 
investment through their impact on effective demand, 
thus reducing actual and potential growth.5 
In a context where inflation arises from a real 
imbalance, the cost of taming it by shrinking demand 
(merely in order to reduce the quantity of money) will 
be very high, since this implies a loss of output (and 
thus employment). At the same time, it is important 
4 See Sunkel (1958) for the classic reference work acknowledging 
and providing evidence for the structural origins of inflation. See also 
Cardoso (1981) for a more recent study of this phenomenon.
5 Tight monetary policy entails higher interest rates, which might 
also have a negative effect on investment by increasing firms’ debt 
service.
to realize that the policy measures described are by no 
means guaranteed to put an end to inflation.6 
In sum, under conditions where an economy is 
expanding and facing domestic supply shortages of food 
commodities, it is likely that growth will be constrained 
at some point. This outcome will be unavoidable when 
an economy is a net importer of food (that is, it is 
an open economy) and international food prices are 
rising (a scenario that, as we have emphasized, has 
been forecast to prevail for at least the next decade). 
Inflation occurs because food weighs heavily in the 
cpi in developing economies, as we have mentioned, 
making this very sensitive to international food price 
movements. Hence, any increase in international food 
prices will generate inflationary pressures (countries will 
in fact be “importing” inflation in this sense), inducing 
the authorities to tighten macroeconomic policy. In a 
scenario of food dependency and rising international food 
prices, therefore, any expansion of output will necessarily 
generate inflationary pressures (via higher employment, 
à la Kalecki, and via “imported” inflation) that give rise 
to a domestic growth constraint.7 The economy will be 
unable to grow sustainably in consequence. 
It could also be the case that international food price 
inflation might reinforce or give rise to the domestic 
growth constraint in food-dependent economies that are, 
paradoxically, not growing (in this context, or even under 
conditions of low growth, the demand for food tends to be 
very stable, rising only in line with increasing population), 
because the economy will merely “import” inflation. If 
growth is stagnating (or, even worse, is negative), the 
sort of conventional macroeconomic policies applied to 
fight inflation will aggravate the deterioration of the real 
economy. Additionally, as mentioned, since the source 
of inflation is a real imbalance (reflected in this case in 
“imported” inflation), it is unlikely to be controlled. 
Food price inflation (due to either economic 
expansion or imported inflation, or both) may not just 
give rise to or reinforce the domestic growth constraint 
6 This was pointed out long ago by Kaldor, who remarked: “Western 
economists were slow to recognize this point [that fiscal and monetary 
policies had little to do with the persistence of inflation in some Latin 
American economies], with the result that the stabilization policies… 
urged by international organizations proved abortive in halting these 
inflations, though they frequently involved contractions in the level 
of production and employment” (1966, p. 61).
7 Evidently, it could happen that international food prices decline at the 
same time as the food-dependent economy is expanding. In this case, 
the domestic growth constraint will not bite. Even if domestic food 
prices are declining, however, the current account could deteriorate as 
a result of the agricultural trade deficit. As we will see, this contributes 
to the materialization of the external demand growth constraint.
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directly, but may also do so indirectly, in two related 
ways. First, international food price inflation implies a 
larger foreign-exchange requirement to cover a given 
amount of food imports. If the economy in question 
maintains an unsustainable current account deficit8 and 
there is a shortage of foreign exchange, expectations of 
a future devaluation to correct the external imbalance 
will start growing. As is well known, expectations of 
currency depreciation feed inflation due to the expected 
increase in the cost of imported capital goods and other 
production inputs. In this scenario, workers will demand 
a nominal wage that takes into account not only the 
increase in food prices, but also other price increments. 
The resulting wage-price spiral could thus accelerate, 
producing much higher inflation, and the authorities might 
respond by applying tighter demand constraint measures, 
which affect output and growth accordingly.
Second, the increase in domestic inflation resulting 
from food price inflation will have a negative impact on 
the economy’s international competitiveness. In other 
words, rising domestic inflation, other things being equal, 
will strengthen the real exchange rate. Domestic currency 
appreciation will worsen the current account because 
exports will decrease while imports will increase. If the 
resulting external deficit is unsustainable, agents will 
expect the government to devalue in order to correct 
it.9 It is easy to deduce that this will trigger a process 
similar to the one just described, with severely constrained 
economic growth as the final outcome.
It is important to stress that food dependency 
has the potential to reinforce the external or balance-
of-payments growth constraint, as initially proposed 
by Harrod (1933) and Prebisch (1982) but refined by 
Thirlwall (1979). The argument is that an economy 
will be compelled to correct an unsustainable current 
account deficit by shrinking domestic demand when 
such a deficit can no longer be externally financed or 
when exchange-rate adjustments do not suffice to rectify 
the external disequilibrium, or both. As is well known 
(see Keynes, 1936), and as we stressed earlier, changes 
in output (and employment) follow effective demand 
adjustments. An induced reduction in effective demand 
to correct the trade balance will therefore affect growth 
negatively. Likewise, an economy that is expanding faces 
a potential balance-of-payments growth constraint.
8 The agricultural trade deficits obviously run by net food importers 
contribute to a worsening of the current account.
9 If the currency depreciates, domestic inflation will clearly increase, 
adding to the domestic growth constraint.
Much as with the domestic growth constraint theory, 
a key insight of the external demand growth constraint 
approach is that the current account deficit deteriorates 
as a consequence of economic expansion (assuming 
imports grow faster than exports).10 For an economy that 
is food-dependent, any output expansion will therefore 
lead to a deterioration of the agricultural trade balance, 
which will potentially worsen the current account. 
With the current account deteriorating, growth will be 
constrained when policies to reduce aggregate demand 
are applied at any point. This being so, it is clear that 
food dependency contributes directly to the emergence 
of the balance-of-payments growth constraint.
To sum up, international food price inflation and 
food dependency represent a negative combination 
for growth, since they are a potent source of domestic 
demand and external growth constraints. If any of 
these constraints materialize, economic growth cannot 
be long sustained. However, in practice policymakers 
frequently respond more quickly to inflationary 
pressures than to current account deficits. This is often 
because policymakers are bound by inflation targeting 
frameworks and tend not to worry about external 
deficits so long as they are relatively small and can be 
financed. Furthermore, they expect (often wrongly) 
that exchange-rate adjustments will rectify the external 
deficit.11 Given the predicted evolution of food price 
inflation over the coming decades, the question that 
naturally arises is how far this phenomenon will affect 
domestic inflation and thus give rise to the domestic 
growth constraint.
To shed light on this question, we use the Mexican 
economy as our case study. There are two reasons for this. 
First, Mexico is an economy in which food dependency 
has steadily increased since the mid-1980s, i.e., since the 
adoption of trade liberalization policies. Second, food 
still has a large weight in its cpi. Mexico’s central bank 
has accordingly recognized that domestic inflation has 
been subjected to upward pressures since international 
food prices started to soar. This is despite the fact that 
economic growth in Mexico since the early 1980s has 
been, on average, low and unstable. This being so, as we 
10 Not all economies that expand will face a current account deficit 
(a remarkable recent example here being the Chinese economy). The 
net trade balance, we must recall, depends ultimately on the income 
elasticities of imports and exports.
11 Even if the Marshall-Lerner condition holds, there is no guarantee 
that currency depreciation will improve the trade balance (see, for 
example, Thirlwall, 2003), at least in the short term (see Harberger, 
1950; Laursen and Metzler, 1950). Even if it does, it might lead to a 
severe loss of real output (see Krugman and Taylor, 1978).
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argue above, the authorities’ decision to fight inflation 
has constrained the expansion of output in the recent 
past and will continue to do so, without succeeding in 
taming inflation. We argue that the Mexican experience 
indicates that when the source of inflation is a real 
imbalance, fighting inflation by conventional means 
produces ineffective results and severe real costs in 
terms of output, employment. 
We shall now estimate the expected long-term 
effects of food price inflation on Mexican inflation. 
First, though, we present a brief overview of Mexico’s 
food dependency. 
III
Mexico’s dependency on imported food  
and its consumer price index
Nothing in the growth literature suggests that governments 
should neglect the primary sector as economies climb 
the ladder of development, for example by removing 
trade protection and reducing technological and financial 
support. Nor should increasing development imply a shift 
from growing self-sufficiency in food production to food 
dependency.12 It is therefore surprising that Mexico’s 
dependence on imported food started to increase steadily 
just about the time its per capita income reached its 
highest-ever level (around US$ 7,400 in real terms in 
the early 1980s). Furthermore, and just as surprisingly, 
Mexico’s food dependency started to intensify even 
as per capita income stagnated over the course of the 
following decade. 
Although it is not the main focus of this paper, it 
is important to mention that Mexico’s growing food 
dependency can be traced to both declining government 
support for the primary sector and trade liberalization 
policies, sealed with the launch of nafta. The combined 
outcome of decreasing government support and the 
nafta-driven trade liberalization strategy has been an 
ever-growing gap between domestic food production 
and demand (with demand growth having been driven 
essentially by the rise in population).13 This gap has 
12 In fact, empirical evidence shows (and development theory implies, 
with the idea that primary sector exports should finance industrial 
imports during the early stages of development) that industrializing 
economies ought to deploy the necessary measures to guarantee food 
self-sufficiency and that, once industrialized, they should be able to 
continue exporting food commodities. In fact, Kaldor (1966) goes 
further in emphasizing the importance of the agricultural sector to the 
industrialization process by arguing that any successful industrialization 
strategy must be underpinned by the development and maintenance of 
an agricultural surplus, “…that is, the excess of food production over 
the food consumption of the food producers themselves” (p. 55).
13 By contrast with other developing economies such as China and 
India, economic performance cannot explain Mexico’s rising demand 
been filled by rising imports of food, which have steadily 
increased food dependency. 
Part of the reason for the stagnation of domestic 
food production after trade opening lies in the inability 
of domestic producers to compete with imports. Another 
reason, however, is that many farmers have shifted 
production towards more profitable products (see Calva, 
2007). Additionally, trade liberalization hastened the 
abandonment of government support for the primary 
sector, a process that started during the early 1980s 
with the debt crisis and the adoption of International 
Monetary Fund (imf) and World Bank stabilization and 
adjustment programmes. In effect, both public expenditure 
and investment to support the primary sector declined 
sharply: public expenditure of this type fell from 0.89% 
of gdp in 1990 to 0.57% in 1999, while public investment 
fell from 0.31% to 0.09% in the same period (Calva, 
2001). Moreover, credit to the agricultural sector grew 
only weakly after 1990 even in nominal terms, and it 
has been decreasing since 1998. 
Our earlier arguments are underscored by the fact that 
domestic production of five basic grains (beans, maize, 
wheat, sorghum and rice) increased by a negligible 4% 
from 1994 to 2005 while imports of these foodstuffs kept 
growing substantially (food imports increased by 66% 
from 1994 to 2005), and that Mexico has increasingly 
been an importer of food since the mid-1980s (see 
table 1).
for imported food. During the 1985-2007 period, for example, Mexico’s 
average output and per capita income growth rates were just 2.8% 
and 1.2%, respectively. The main explanation for Mexico’s growing 
imports of food commodities, therefore, has been population growth 
coupled with the stagnation of domestic production, particularly 
since the early 1990s.
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With domestic food output stagnant, little is being 
produced for external markets, whereas the demand 
for food imports has kept increasing. It is therefore not 
surprising that Mexico has been facing a chronic and ever 
growing agricultural trade deficit (see figure 1). Periods in 
which this account has recovered, i.e., gone into surplus, 
have been the result of severe constraints on demand to 
deal with economic crises. The agricultural trade deficit 
TABLE 1
Mexico: domestic production and imports of food, 1985-2005
(Thousands of tonnes)
Year Food importsa Domestic food productiona Dependencyratio
1985 5 109.99 27 633.90 0.18
1986 2 889.23 23 144.90 0.12
1984 4 860.16 23 954.30 0.20
1988 5 683.10 21 469.90 0.26
1989 7 031.67 21 450.10 0.33
1990 7 783.27 26 226.30 0.30
1991 5 312.54 24 345.70 0.22
1992 7 368.63 27 015.60 0.27
1993 5 977.63 25 863.70 0.23
1994 7 987.05 27 825.60 0.29
1995 4 991.12 27 628.90 0.18
1996 10 283.33 29 953.80 0.34
1997 6 908.88 28 459.10 0.24
1998 11 402.73 29 883.40 0.38
1999 13 303.50 27 833.30 0.48
2000 13 796.98 28 131.70 0.49
2001 15 179.77 31 265.50 0.49
2002 15 278.69 29 516.20 0.52
2003 14 360.34 31 864.50 0.45
2004 12 999.98 32 453.30 0.40
2005 13 284.35 28 996.40 0.46
Source: eclac database (available at: www.eclac.cl).
a Includes five basic grains: beans, maize, wheat, sorghum and rice.
FIGURE 1
Mexico: agricultural trade balance, 1985-2005
(Millions of dollars)
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has contributed to the overall current account deficit, 
which in turn has put pressure on the currency. 
With the above in mind, it is important to stress 
that food is still extremely important in Mexico’s cpi, 
accounting for around 22% of the index. Thus, variations 
in international food prices can clearly exercise a direct 
effect on the cpi. There might also be an indirect effect 
on inflation through the higher production costs implied 
for commodities which use food as an input. Thus, the 
influence of food on the cpi may in fact be larger than 
is suggested by its 22% weight in the index. 
Figures 2 and 3 indicate that there is a strong positive 
link between food prices and the cpi, in both the short 
and long terms. This, coupled with food dependency, 
suggests that food price inflation might indeed have a 
significant impact on overall domestic inflation. In fact, 
Mexico’s central bank has been arguing that international 
factors, in particular rising international food prices, 
have been the main cause of domestic inflation since 
2001. At the same time, its measures to tame inflation 
have not deviated from the conventional approach that 
treats this as an exclusively monetary phenomenon (see 
Informe Anual del Banco de México, various issues). As 
a result, the fight against inflation in Mexico has had 
severe costs for real output. Seen from this perspective, 
inflation and the efforts to control it, irrespective of its 
monetary nature, have been turning into a structural 
problem. In this context, it is very likely that efforts to 
tame inflation by conventional means (i.e., tightening 
the money supply by reducing public expenditure and 
increasing the interest rate) will continue to have little or 
no effect on it, but will instead reduce economic growth, 
output and employment.
Given Mexico’s increasing dependence on imported 
food and the expected continuation of food price 
inflation over the near term, it is important to ascertain 
quantitatively the degree to which food price inflation 
affects Mexico’s cpi, thus giving rise to a domestic growth 
constraint. The next section sheds light on these issues 
by applying dynamic panel techniques.
FIGURE 2
Mexico: long-term link between food prices and the cpi, 1980-2005
Source: Prepared by the authors on the basis of Bank of Mexico data (www.banxico.org.mex).
Note: Index, June 2002 = 100 
Mexican consumer price index (dotted line). 
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To determine the size of the impact that higher food prices 
might have on Mexico’s cpi, we estimate a price equation 
using panel data for 1997-2004 in Mexico’s 32 provinces, 
including the Federal District, and a set of different types 
of dynamic panel estimators. The estimators employed 
include the Anderson-Hsiao estimator (Anderson and 
Hsiao, 1981 and 1982), the Arellano-Bond generalized 
method of moments (gmm) estimator (Arellano and Bond, 
1991) and its augmented version, the Arellano-Bover 
and Blunder-Bond system gmm estimators (Arellano 
and Bover, 1995; Blunder and Bond, 1998). The use of 
such estimators is appropriate in this context because 
prices are often modelled as dynamic processes and the 
ordinary least squares (ols) and within-group estimators 
are both biased and inconsistent when used to estimate 
highly persistent data. 
More specifically, determining whether international 
shocks to local commodity prices had a lasting impact 
on Mexico’s cpi would involve the estimation of price 
equations that combined individual specific effects with 
dynamic effects. We estimate the following equation:
 p pi t i t i t t, ,= + + +− α1 , ,x ui iδ β  (1)
where pi,t stands for Mexico’s cpi, αi is an unobservable 
province-specific effect which is constant across time, 
xi,t is a vector of explanatory variables and ui,t is a 
random disturbance term. In other words, we estimate 
FIGURE 3
Mexico: short-term link between food prices and the cpi, 1980-2005
Source: Prepared by the authors on the basis of Bank of Mexico data (www.banxico.org.mex).
Note: Index, June 2002 = 100
Mexican consumer price index (solid line). 
Mexican food price index (dotted line).
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an equation in which the cpi is the response variable, 
whereas the lagged cpi, money supply (M2), gdp, the 
nominal exchange rate and the prices of four basic grains 
(maize, wheat, sorghum and rice), plus those of meat 
(red and poultry) and milk, are the regressors. 
Our model includes a lagged cpi, reflecting the 
fact that prices are often considered to be persistent 
phenomena. Money supply is a variable typically used 
in the price modelling literature (see Welsh, 2003; imf, 
1996), as it measures the extent to which inflation is a 
monetary phenomenon, particularly in the long term. 
We include gdp in our equation in order to measure the 
impact of demand on prices and the nominal exchange 
rate (ner) and to capture how inflation is affected by 
exchange-rate depreciations (recall that in our theoretical 
framework we mentioned that inflation feeds the exchange 
rate which, if devalued, in turn feeds back into inflation). 
The remaining variables are introduced to measure the 
effect of domestic food prices on the cpi and thus to 
identify the extent to which the evolution of prices might 
give rise to the domestic growth constraint. We assume 
that domestic food prices fully reflect the movements 
of food prices on international markets.
It is important to note that, from an econometric 
point of view, equation (1) is affected by two problems: 
(i) food prices, gdp and the nominal exchange rate are 
likely to be endogenous, given that they might be jointly 
determined with the cpi (simultaneity), which implies that 
these regressors may be correlated with the error term; 
and (ii) there is the possibility of unobserved province-
specific effects correlated with the explanatory variables, 
including the lagged cpi. Thus, it seems desirable to 
control for such individual effects to obtain unbiased 
and consistent parameter estimates.
To obtain consistent estimates of the parameters 
of interest, a better approach would be to transform 
equation (1) by taking first differences of the data, 
thereby eliminating the problem of correlation between 
the lagged cpi and province-specific effects. Thus, the 
alternative specification to equation (1) would be:
 ∆ ∆p pi t i t i t i t, ,= + +−1 , ,δ βx u∆ ∆  (2)
where the province-specific effects (αi) have been 
eliminated, but, by construction, there is still correlation 
between the lagged first difference of the cpi and the 
error term. To purge this correlation, we can use the 
Anderson-Hsiao estimator (1981, 1982), which suggests 
we use either lags of the level of the cpi or lags of the 
first-differenced cpi ( pi,t-2 or  ∆pi,t-2) as valid instruments. 
However, the Anderson-Hsiao estimator is inefficient 
because it does not use all the existing instruments. It can 
be improved by using the Arellano-Bond first-differenced 
gmm estimator, which uses the price equation (2) and all 
the orthogonality conditions that exist between lagged 
values of the cpi and the disturbances. 
Nevertheless, the Arellano-Bond first-differenced 
gmm estimator is less efficient than the Arellano-Bover 
system gmm estimator, provided that the latter exploits 
additional moment conditions by combining the price 
equation in differences and levels within a single system. 
Each is provided with a specific set of instrumental 
variables, as follows: 
 ∆ ∆p pi t i t i t i t, ,= + +−1 , ,δ βx u∆ ∆  (3) 
 p pi t i t i t t, ,= + + +− α1 , ,x ui iδ β  (4) 
Equation (4) denotes the price data-generating 
process in levels, in which the province-specific effect 
is not eliminated but must be controlled for by the use 
of instrumental variables. This set-up is superior, then, 
because it exploits additional moment conditions and gives 
us substantial efficiency gains over the first-difference 
estimator. Although the dynamic panel estimators are an 
improvement over cross-sectional estimators, not all of 
them will perform equally well. To judge the reliability 
of our price equation estimations, it is advisable to carry 
out specification tests. 
One such test is the so-called Sargan test of 
overidentifying restrictions, which allows us to ensure 
the validity of the instruments by analysing the sample 
counterparts of the moment conditions used in the 
estimation process. Another important specification 
test is the serial correlation test. This test verifies 
whether the residual of the regression in differences is 
first- or second-order serially correlated. We expect the 
differenced residuals to be first-order serially correlated, 
unless they follow a random walk. However, we also 
expect to find that such residuals are not second-order 
serially correlated, allowing us to ensure the validity of 
the instruments postulated.
We now consider the estimation of equation (2) using 
the three aforementioned dynamic panel estimators to 
ensure the robustness of our results. In table 2 we report 
dynamic panel estimates of the long-term elasticities 
resulting from the long-term static solution of our 
price equation.14 The lagged dependent variables in 
14 For comparative purposes, in table A1 of the appendix we also 
report ols and within estimates of the parameters, which are biased 
and inconsistent. It is worth mentioning that the ols estimates are not 
very far from our dynamic panel estimates.
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levels and first differences are used as instruments in 
the Anderson-Hsiao estimates in the first two columns. 
Column 3 shows the Arellano-Bond gmm estimates, where 
the money supply (M2) is treated as strictly exogenous 
and all the other explanatory variables and their lags are 
used as instruments. Column 4 shows the system gmm 
estimates, where money supply is treated as exogenous 
and the rest of the explanatory variables and their lags 
(predetermined variables) are included as instruments. 
The instruments we use passed the Sargan tests and the 
AR(1) and AR(2) tests for autocorrelation.
As can be seen in table 2, all variables are statistically 
significant and the estimated results from the different 
panel data techniques are similar. They all confirm that, 
as expected, food prices will have a large influence on 
the cpi in the long term. Due to the fact that the system 
gmm estimates are more efficient than the Anderson-
Hsiao estimates, we use the former estimated parameters 
to draw inferences. 
The first point to make is that, on the face of it, one 
could argue that the cpi will not be significantly affected 
by international food price movements because the 
TABLE 2







































































































Wald (joint) 0.000 [21] 0.000 [20] 0.000 [29] 0.000 [29]
Wald (dummy) 0.000 [3] 0.000 [3] 0.000 [11] 0.000 [12]
Wald (time) 0.000 [3] 0.000 [3] 0.000 [3] 0.000 [3]
Sargan test - - 0.999 [94] 0.999 [193]
First-order autocorrelation test AR(2) 0.559 0.570 0.022 0.928
First-order autocorrelation test AR(1) 0.682 0.738 0.049 0.013
No. of observations 27 27 46 46
Source: Prepared by the authors on the basis of Bank of Mexico data (www.banxico.org.mex).
a A set of valid moment restrictions involving lagged prices, gdp and ner are exploited. Additional instruments used are the stacked levels 
and first differences of dependent variables and prices, gdp and ner.
Notes:
(i) M2 is the sum of the M1 monetary aggregate (currency in circulation + demand deposits in the banking system) and savings deposits.
(ii) Asymptotic standard errors robust to general cross-section and time series heteroskedasticity are reported in parentheses.
(iii) Time dummy variables are included in all equations.
(iv) We report the p-value, while the degrees of freedom are in parentheses.
(v) Anderson-Hsiao type equations are estimated using the third lag of the cpi as instrument.
(vi) The gmm estimates reported are all two-step.
(vii) dif indicates that in the model, the variables are in differences; sys indicates that he variables in the model are in levels.
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V
Conclusions 
International food prices have soared since 2001 to 
unprecedented levels. Food price inflation is expected to 
persist in the near future as demand for food continues to 
overwhelm supply. Countries which are highly dependent 
on imported food commodities and where foods weigh 
heavily in the cpi are and will continue to be adversely 
affected in terms of their domestic inflation. This, in turn, 
will give rise to an inescapable domestic growth constraint. 
Mexico is an economy that lacks food self-sufficiency. It 
is also one in which food has a large weighting in the cpi 
(around 25%). Since the mid-1980s, food dependency has 
intensified, and domestic food production has stagnated. 
In this paper, we have used dynamic panel techniques to 
investigate the extent to which rising food prices influence 
Mexico’s cpi and how that affects the materialization of 
the domestic growth constraint .
Our estimated long-term elasticities indicate that 
domestic prices will be severely affected by food price 
elasticities associated with each food item are relatively 
low. However, this conclusion might be misleading. 
If grain prices continuously increase, for example, as 
forecast by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (oecd) and the Food and Agriculture 
Organization of the United Nations (fao), then the sum 
of the elasticities of three basic grains (0.1658), namely, 
wheat, maize and sorghum (0.0573, 0.0548 and 0.0537, 
respectively), easily overwhelms the elasticity of the 
cpi with respect to changes in the money supply. This 
implies that an increase of 10% in the price of these 
food grains will push inflation up by 1.7%. This is by 
no means a negligible impact, and it shows that many 
of the inflationary pressures Mexico will face in future 
will be of a structural character. It means that inflation 
in Mexico is indeed quite sensitive to the prices of basic 
grains. Moreover, if the prices of several foodstuffs 
increase considerably at the same time then, in our case, 
the exercise of summing up the elasticities of our edible 
commodities more than doubles the response of the cpi 
to changes in the money supply. Thus, food prices will 
put considerable pressure on domestic inflation, and 
the domestic growth constraint is likely to materialize 
as a result. At the same time, other things being equal, 
the international competitiveness of exports is likely to 
be negatively affected by the rise in prices, leading to a 
deterioration in the current account that would feed back 
into inflationary pressures. If this occurs, policymakers 
are likely to fight inflation by conventional means, with 
a negative effect on growth.
Our findings, then, suggest that, given the country’s 
dependence on imported food, Mexican inflation will 
turn into a largely structural problem (a real imbalance). 
Under these circumstances, it is very likely that the 
authorities will find it difficult to tame inflation with 
their conventional tools, and that these will negatively 
affect output and economic growth instead. 
Another point worth noting is that the estimated 
long-term elasticity of the cpi to gdp is very low (0.0306), 
suggesting that expansionary policies can be applied 
without much risk of generating inflation. In particular, 
expansionary policies to support the primary sector and 
expand its production could be implemented without the 
risk of generating inflation. 
The policy recommendation that derives from our 
estimates is that the best way to control inflation in the long 
term is to eliminate its structural component. Evidently, 
this cannot be done by imposing price controls or export 
restrictions or by further augmenting food imports. 
Neither can it be done by tightening the money supply or 
maintaining an overvalued exchange rate. These policy 
options, though real and feasible alternatives, will only 
solve the problem of food dependency and imported 
inflation on a short-term basis. The long-term policy 
solution to this problem consists in putting the primary 
sector on the agenda of national priorities, as developed 
nations have done (see Chang, 2009), providing support 
until a greater degree of food self-sufficiency is achieved. 
This can be done through several mechanisms, which 
include land (reform) policy; research, education and 
information policy; credit policy; inputs policy, such 
as canal irrigation, infrastructure, transport, marketing, 
processing and the use of price guarantees to maintain 
the stability of producers’ incomes; warehousing; trade 
protection; insurance; and so on (see Calva, 2002; Chang, 
2009). Kalecki (1954, p. 30) advocates the adoption of 
the policies suggested, stating that “the expansion of food 
production… is of paramount importance in avoiding 
inflationary pressures”, particularly when economic 
expansion and industrial development are under way.
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inflation. In the long term, we have established that the 
responsiveness of the cpi to changes in food prices will 
be more than double its reaction to changes in the money 
supply. This indicates that the root of domestic inflation 
will be structural rather than monetary. In this context, 
monetary policy is likely to fail to control inflation if 
the agricultural price issue is not taken into account, 
instead placing further constraints on economic growth. 
Effective control of inflation should therefore prioritize 
the primary sector with the aim of restoring its supply 





















































Wald (joint) 0.000 [23] 0.000 [18]
Wald (dummy) 0.000 [14] 0.000 [6]
Wald (time) 0.000 [4] 0.000 [6]
First-order autocorrelation test AR(2) 0.003 0.964
First-order autocorrelation test AR(1) 0.003 0.095
No. of observations 46 65
Source: Prepared by the authors on the basis of Bank of Mexico data (www.banxico.org.mex).
Notes:
(i) M2 is the sum of the M1 monetary aggregate (currency in circulation + demand deposits in the banking system) and savings deposits.
(ii) Asymptotic standard errors robust to general cross-section and time series heteroskedasticity are reported in parentheses.
(iii) Time dummies are included in all equations.
(iv) We report the p-value, while the degrees of freedom are in parentheses.
(v) Column (1) reports ols estimates of the equation in levels.
(vi) Column (2) reports within-group estimates. These are ols estimates of the equation in deviations from time means.
(vii) cpi: consumer price index.
(viii) gdp: gross domestic product. 
(ix) ner: nominal exchange rate.
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